considering our problems, the question of food supplies therefore took a foremost place in the rank.

The first half of the War demonstrated clearly how vital were transport on sea and land and the supply of munitions to a successful prosecution of

food supplies brought home to all the belligerents the fact which ought to have been obvious before, that an adequate supply of food, not only for the troops, but for the civilian population, was an essential condition of their continuance in the War.

The final event depended more on food than on fighting. The drain on man-power, and the concentration of transport on the provision of war material and the carrying of it to the various fronts, were already having a serious effect on food supplies.

When I took over the supreme war direction in December, 1916, I found Russia on the

owing to food point of falling to pieces

In Russia rpt ° I?

shortage. The munition problem there had by no means been solved, but it had considerably improved, and in spite of huge losses there was no lack of fit men to fill up the gaps. But the supply of food for the cities and for certain sectors of the front had broken down completely, and in the grimmest of Russian winters millions of householders, from lack of sustenance and fuel, were shivering many degrees below the freezing line. To these hungry and chilled multitudes and their soldier sons, brothers and husbands, revolution was not only

acceptable,
but inevitable. It was the only alternative to famine.
A sufficiency of food and fuel might have kept Russia
in the War right to the end, no longer perhaps a
steamroller, but at least a stone wall.
Austria was also suffering more and more severely